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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LLOYD STANGER and EDNA 
OLSON STANGER, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
> 11028 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
THE CASES CITED IN RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF SUPPORT APPELLANTS' CLAIM 
THAT THEIR PROPERTIES HAVE SUS-
T A I NE D COMPENSABLE SEVERANCE 
DAMAGES. 
In its brief (pp. 2 & 3) the State Road Commission 
argues that the trial judge was clearly correct in his 
1 
comments and instructions to the jury concerning 
severance damages. Specifically, the respondent refers 
to Instruction No. 7 as requiring that severance dam-
age, in order to be compensable, " ... not be entirely 
due to the project's presence in the general area; ... " 
(Ephasis added). In other words, the respondent 
argues that the jury was called upon to separate non-
compensable damages from compensable damages. The 
respondent then equates noncompensable damages with 
the infringement of the rights of access, light, air, view, 
drainage and privacy. 
The errors in respondent's argument will be pointed 
out infra, but first it must be made clear that Instruc-
tion No. 7 was more sweeping than the respondent 
represents. In fact, Instruction No. 7 required that sev-
erance damage, in order to be compensable, not be " ... 
in part, or entirely, because of the projects (project's) 
presents (presence) in the general area independant 
(independent) of this taking ... " (Emphasis added). 
In other words, the court effectively precluded the jury 
from even considering those damages which the State 
of Utah claimed to be noncompensable by requiring 
that no segment or part of the damage suffered by 
the appellants be shared in common with their neigh-
bors. The trial judge would have saved time in obtain-
ing the result he did by granting the respondent's Mo· 
tion for Directed Verdict instead of reserving the ruling. 
As previously indicated, the respondent argued 
m its brief that, in arriving at severance damages, a 
2 
distinction must be drawn between compensable and 
noncompensable damages. In defining the line of de-
marcation between the two, the respondent cites (p. 4) 
State Road Commission v. Fourth District Court, 94 
Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 (1937), for the proposition 
that compensable damages are those which are action-
able. The quotation furnished by respondent from the 
Fourth District case is abstract in form, posing the 
question, but not giving the answer. Ironically, the 
answer can be obtained from a careful study of the 
cases cited by respondent in its own brief. 
Before making an analysis of the authorities cited 
by respondent, it would be well to place those cases in 
their proper perspective. In doing so the distinction 
recognized by Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, between damage to a parcel, part of which is 
taken, and damage to a parcel, though no part thereof 
is taken, must be given at least some significance. The 
significance of this distinction was pointed out in Rose 
v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505 (1942), a case 
which respondent cited in its brief and in which the 
court held that where the necessity for assessing dam-
ages to private property arose apart from any taking of 
property, the problem of limiting the landowner's re-
covery to items for which he is legally entitled to recover 
damages becomes more acute. 
The cases cited by the respondent deal, for the most 
part, with factual situations where there was no actual 
taking of real property. Many of these cases are con-
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cerned with damages which all courts have agreed are 
noncompensable; namely, diversion of traffic, creation 
of cul-de-sacs involving no taking, and the separation of 
traffic lanes by construction of medians. 
The respondent argues that this distinction is not 
a viable one, particularly where only a sliver of land 
is taken. The respondent argues that " . . . (b) oth 
types of situations should be treated equally, ... " 
(p. 4). However, respondent feels it more fair and 
equitable to recognize the damage, but to declare it non-
compensable in an effort to establish equality than to 
compensate for all damage. 
Looking now to those specific cases cited by the 
respondent, it can be seen that other courts, and in fact 
this very Court, have seen fit to compensate a landowner 
though no part of his property has suffered a physical 
taking. Furthermore, the question of, What constitutes 
actionable damage?, can be answered. 
The case quoted most extensively by the respondent 
was the case of Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 
505 (1942). It will be noted that the quotation (p. 6) 
is replete with reference to the noncompensability of 
damages caused by a diversion of traffic. The appellants 
have no quarrel with the quotation so long as it is limited 
to the facts of that case and is applied, as the California 
court intended, to the element of damage caused by a 
diversion of traffic. 
The Rose case concerned an action by Rose and 
others to recover damages caused by the building of 
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an underpass in the street in front of their properties. 
Rose's land consisted of a total of 3.05 acres zoned 
industrial but devoted to a fruit orchard with residence, 
barn, tankhouse and windmill. The plaintiff's property 
was adjacent to the railroad tracks. The underpass 
was constructed in front of the plaintiff's property in 
a street which was originally 66 feet wide. The under-
pass was 16.5 feet deep and 24 feet wide. On each side 
of the underpass were 14.5 foot wide cul-de-sacs. There 
was absolutely no physical taking of land owned by 
plaintiff. 
The court considered the case as presenting two 
major questions: (1) Whether Section 14 of Article 
I of the California constitution was self-executing, and 
( 2) Whether the plaintiff suffered a compensable dam-
age within the meaning of the constitution. 
The court held that by the words, "Private prop-
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public use with-
out just compensation having first been made . . . ", 
an inverse condemnation case could be brought against 
the state. The constitutional provision was self-execut-
mg. 
In affirming the trial judge's holding that the plain-
tiff was entitled to compensation, the court said on 
page 514: 
"That the owner of property fronting upon 
a street or highway has as appurtenant thereto 
certain private easements in the street in front 
of or adjacent to the lot-distinguished from 
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the public easements therein-which are a part 
and portion of his property and are the private 
property of the lot owner as fully as the lot itself, 
is not open fo question." 
The court then quoted with approval another Cali-
fornia case on page 514, as follows: 
"The property which an abutting owner has m 
the street in front of his land is the right of 
access and of light and air, and for an infringe-
ment of these rights he is entitled to compensa-
tion. This right is peculiar and individual to the 
abutting owner, differing from the right of pass-
ing to and fro upon the street, which he enjoys 
in common with the public, and any infringe-
ment thereof gives him a right of action." 
The court specifically held that the doctrine of 
damnum absque injuria had no application where the 
person suffering the damage had a property right, : 
the right of access in that case. The trial judge was Uf 
held in finding that the plaintiff's easement of acces~ 
or right of ingress or egress was substantially impaired 
by the construction of the subway. Denials of damage; 
on the basis that they occurred through an exercise of 
the police power was ruled out since police power in-
volved "regulation" and no regulation was there present. 
Instead, the case was said to be the result of a public 
improvement constructed by the state in its exercise of 
the power of eminent domain. The case was contrasted 
with cul-de-sac cases on the basis that in those cases 
there was no impairment of access, as here. 
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The State Road Commission also cited (p. 8) the 
case of State Highway Commission v. Silva, 71 N. M. 
350, 378 P. 2d 595 (1962), for the application of the 
doctrine of damnum absque injuria. The respondent's 
brief did not, however, make clear that-
" . . . ( t) he real cause of the depreciation in 
value of their property by reason of the highway 
improvement is the diversion of traffic from U.S. 
85 to the new interstate highway." (378 P.2d 
595, 596). 
The Silva case is concerned with the diversion of 
traffic from the landowners' bar by the creation of a 
cul-de-sac. The second paragraph of the opinion 'says, 
on page 596: 
r:s 
"It should be noted that none of defendants' 
property was appropriated, nor was there any 
change of grade on the road in front of their 
property." 
11. Respondent represents in its brief (p. 3) that 
ipringville Banking Company v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 
·?JO, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960), is authority for the propo-
:)ton that certain damages are noncompensable whether 
~1ere is no taking or whether there is a "tiny taking". 
'l'he Springville Banking case was concerned with a 
rnedian to divide traffic lanes. There was no physical 
tlking in that case nor is there reference to such. 
f; ·"The State Road Commission cites Annotation, 22 
A.L.R. 145, 148 (1923), at which point the Annotation 
makes reference to the Georgia case of Austin v. 
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Augusta Terminal R. Co., 108 Ga. 671, 34 S.E. 852 
( 1899). The Annotation is entitled, "Right of abutting 
owner to compensation for railroad in street under con-
stitutional provision against damaging property for 
public use without compensation." For clarity the 
Annotation is arranged in outline form. Under II (a) 
the Annotation refers generally to the divergency of 
court opinions, pointing out that there exists a strict 
construction and a liberal construction. Under II (b) 
the annotation cites those cases strictly construing the 
constructional provision, including the Austin case 
ref erred to in respondent's brief. Under II ( c) the 
annotation cites those cases liberally construing these 
constitutional provisions, including the Utah case of 
Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western R. Co., 28 Utah 
201, 77 Pac. 849 ( 1904). Further on the Annotation 
discusses specific injuries which are either compensable 
or noncompensable. Under III ( d) (2), regarding 
interference with access by changing grade, the Anno-
tation says on page 171: 
"The cases uniformly hold that if the grade 
of a street is changed by a cut, or embankment, 
or a viaduct, so as to interfere with the abutting 
owner's ingress and egress, he is entitled to dam-
" ages. 
The respondent's brief does cite the Stockdale case 
( p. 7) but only to quote the court's limitation to the 
doctrine which it had previously announced and which 
had controlled the case. In restraining the defendant 
from operating cars over a railway track adjacent to 
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the plaintiff's premises, this Court quoted 1 Lewis on 
Eminent Domain ( 2 d Ed) Sec. 57, to this effect: 
" ... And the great weight of the more recent 
judicial authority, which we believe to be sup-
ported by the better reason, and which is more 
in accord with our ideas of equity and natural 
justice, holds that any substantial interference 
with private property which destroys or ma-
terially lessens its value, or by which the owner's 
right to its use and enjoyment is in any sub-
stantial degree abridged or destroyed, is, in fact 
and in law, a taking, in the constitutional sense, 
to the extent of the damages suffered, even 
though the title and possession of the owner re-
main undisturbed." 
The Stockdale case is consistent with the case of 
Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Company, 9 
Utah 31, 33 Pac. 229 (1893), which was cited by re-
spondent (p. 13) and by appellants (p. 32) in their orig-
inal brief. In that case the railroad company was pro-
hibited from constructing a third set of tracks in the 
street in front of the plaintiffs' homes. This court, in the 
words of respondent, " ... recognized that the abutting 
property owner could recover for an established right of 
easement ... " In that case the established right oi 
easement was had by the abutting property owner over 
the street which was held in fee by Salt Lake City. In 
the case at bar the established right of "easement" is 
over the street which is actually owned in fee by the 
appellants! As shown by its Complaint (R. 1) the re-
spondent is acquiring fee title to 0.89 acre of land, 
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0.66 acre of which is within the north half of Seventh 
Street. 
Coming back to the case of State Road Commission 
v. Jlourth District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 
( 1937) , a quota ti on therefrom is found on page 16 of 
respondent's brief. The respondent quotes that-
"In some jurisdictions ... there must be a 
taking of property . . . " 
What the respondent doesn't report is that this Court 
specifically held in the Fourth District case on page 
508 that reference to damaged property in the Utah 
constitution was intended to put an end to contro-
versy " . . . and to protect the damaged property 
owner equally with the property owner whose land was 
physically entered upon." 
On page 3 of Respondent's Brief the following 
interesting statement appears: 
" ... It is the jury's duty to separate non-
compensable damagfs from compensable dam-
ages and allow only the constitutional 'just 
compensation' to the condemnee." 
Appellants take issue with the foregoing statement 
and affirmatively counter with the claim that it is not 
the jury's duty to separate compensable from non-
compensable damages; rather, it is the province of the 
Court during the course of trial to exclude evidence 
of damages relating to noncompensable items. To 
illustrate how this works in actual practice, the case of 
Utah Road Com1nission v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383 
10 
P. 2d 917 (1963), which was apparently cited by 
respondent in support of the fore going quotation, illus-
trates the practical workings relative to the problem. 
In the Hansen case the property owner attempted 
to introduce evidence in support of damages relating 
to the cost of removing several hundred wrecked auto-
mobiles from his premises, business losses due to a pre-
mature sale of approximately 180 of such automobiles, 
and a separate item of damages resulting from a loss of 
access to a portion of his properties. As to these separate 
claimed items of damage the trial court excluded evi-
dence of such items since, under the circumstances of 
the case and the applicable law, the item,s were non-
compensable or included within the general measure 
of damages. As for the cost of removing the automobiles 
and the business losses, such items were not compen-
sable because they were outside the rule of recovery 
in eminent domain cases; accordingly, the Court prop-
erly excluded them. The Court further excluded evi-
dence relative to a special amount to be designated for 
"loss of access" since that figure was an element which 
went into the general amount of damages to be awarded. 
In fact, the Court properly pointed out that the measure 
of damages to the real properties involved which were 
not taken was the " . . . difference in the value of the 
remaining tract before and after the taking." 
Appellants submit that the province of the Court 
is to rule as to whether specific claimed item~ of damage 
are compensable or noncompensable, and that it is the 
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province of the jury to weigh the offered and admitted 1 
evidence in arriving at its decision. In no case which 
has ever come to the attention of this writer has an 
attempt been made, such as here, to suggest that it 
is the province of the jury to make a legal determination 
of what items of damage are compensable as distin-
guished from those which are noncompensable. The 
jury tries facts-not law. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing argument it should be clear 
that the delineation of actionable damages to private 
property-though no part thereof is taken (U. C. A. 
Sec. 78-34-10 (3)), is more acute than the delineation 
of actionable damages to remaining private property-
a part of which is taken (U. C. A. Sec. 78-34-10 (2)). 
It should also be abundantly clear that an infringement 
of the rights of access, light, air, view, drainage and 
privacy are compensable under the respondent's de-
marcation at the point of actionable damages. If any 
more clarity is desired the same can be obtained from 
Justice Wade's concurring opinion in Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District v. Gailey, 5 Utah 2d 385, 
303 P. 2d 271, 274 (1963): 
"On the question of what constitutes a taking 
or damaging of private property for public use 
we have held that a change in the grade of an 
adjoining highway and the building of a viaduct 
in the adjoining street inflicted compensable 
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damages to the property of the adjoining land-
owner. Clearly, if such cases caused actionable 
damage to the adjoining property . . . (then 
actionable damage is here present)". (Emphasis 
added). 
Respectfully submitted, 
Glen E. Fuller 
Attorney for Defendants 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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